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Evaluating the Milk Advertising Dollar
James G. Pritchett, Donald J. Liu, Harry M. Kaiser
Got Milk? Who hasn’t been tempted
by the image of a frothy glass of milk
and a plate of chocolate chip cookies?
And everyone knows that “milk does a
body good.”  Whether broadcast
directly into your living room or
printed in a magazine, these images are
the result of a producer-supported,
nationwide dairy promotion program.
In 1983 the Dairy and Tobacco
Adjustment Act authorized a producer
check-off, an assessment of 15 cents
per hundred pounds of milk. Totaling
about $200 million per year, the check-
off funds the National Dairy Promotion
and Research Board, which tries to
increase consumer demand for milk and
dairy products, enhance dairy farm
revenue, and reduce the amount of
surplus milk purchased by the
government.
 Through their promotion organiza-
tions, dairy farmers have increased
fluid milk demand and improved retail
prices via advertising. But are produc-
ers getting the biggest bang for their
advertising buck? That was what we
asked ourselves when we started the
research project reported here.
Expenditure Patterns
To increase consumption, the Dairy
Board invested in generic dairy adver-
tising and promotion, nutrition
research, education, and new product
development. Of these, advertising
(particularly for fluid milk and cheese)
accounts for the largest share of
expenditures. The amount spent on
advertising fluid milk has increased
considerably in recent years, even
when inflation is taken into account
(Figure 1).
A 1997 study found the advertising
of dairy products increased milk
demand by 2.14 percent, which, in turn,
increased farm milk prices by 2.9
percent.
It is important to recognize that
generic fluid milk advertising is a
cooperative effort quite distinct from
branded advertising. Generic advertis-
ing disseminates information about a
nearly homogeneous product, while
branded dairy product advertising
attempts to differentiate one product
from another in the mind of a con-
sumer. None of the $200 million per
year assessment is used for branded
dairy product advertising. Because of
this, we confined our research only to
generic fluid milk advertising.
Generic advertising dollars are spent
in four distinct media outlets, although
television receives more advertising
dollars per quarter than print, radio, or
outdoor advertising combined (Figure
2). Television receives eighty-nine
percent of the advertising budget while
each of the others gets less than five
percent.
Cleaner Air, Lower Costs
Through Markets?
Jay S. Coggins
Pollution control in the United States
has long been based upon “command-
and-control” (CAC) regulation. The
command feature is usually legislation,
passed at the state or federal level, that
regulates polluters. The control is
enforcement of the rules, perhaps by the
Environmental Protection Agency or
the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency. Under these conditions,
polluters, whether large corporations or
individual households, have little
latitude or incentive to devise new
ways to comply with the law. They
must simply adopt particular control
methods or meet clearly specified
emissions targets—or face a penalty.
In the past three decades, consider-
able progress in environmental clean-
up has been achieved with the
command-and-control approach. But
drawbacks have been emphasized by
economists for some time. With a CAC
system, agencies need to know which
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The reason for the bias toward
television has to do with consumer
response. Some media engage the
consumer more quickly and the
advertising message is retained longer.
This is true for television relative to
other media outlets.
We have estimated relative effective-
ness of each advertising outlet using an
economic simulation model. The model
relates the amount of fluid milk sold in
each quarter to factors affecting demand
such as the retail price of milk, con-
sumer income, the price of milk substi-
tutes, seasons of the year, and, for
present purposes, the amount of
television, radio, print, and outdoor
advertising.
By relating the demand factors to
fluid milk sales, our model can ap-
proximate net percentage changes in
sales for a given percentage change in
television, radio, print, or outdoor
advertising expenditures. Figure 3
illustrates television advertising’s
disproportionate impact on fluid milk
sales. For an additional one percent of
funding allocated to television
advertising, total fluid milk demand
would be increased by 0.01281
percent, according to our calculations.
Since total annual demand is roughly
14 billion pounds, this is equivalent to
a demand increase of 179 million
pounds of fluid milk per year. In
contrast, print provides only a 0.00224
percent increase, radio a 0.00158
percent increase, and outdoor a 0.00377
percent increase.
Too Much of a Good Thing?
At first glance, Figure 3 suggests that
television is far and away the most
effective media outlet, followed
distantly by the other three modes. But
while it has had the greatest impact, we
argue that television has been overused
in dairy promotion.
Although it has the largest advertis-
ing response for a given percentage
increase in spending, television’s
expenditure base is substantially larger
than that of the other advertising
modes. For instance, between 1984 and
1993, a one percent increase in adver-
tising expenditures (in 1982 dollars)
was equivalent to a $33,000 increase
per quarter for television, a $2,000
increase for print, $1,600 for radio, and
$900 for outdoor. It follows then that a
one percent increase in television
advertising represented an investment
16.5 times larger than the same percent-
age increase in print advertising. Yet the
advertising responsiveness (the
associated increase in milk demand) of
television is only 5.7 times larger than
that of print.
Our results suggest that the dairy
promotion agency should reallocate
expenditures from television to other
media in order to be more cost-effective.
Recall that fluid milk demand increases
by 0.01281 percent for a percentage
increase in television advertising—
from current spending levels. However,
for every additional dollar spent, the
incremental effect of any advertising
message begins to lose its effectiveness.
Consumers have heard the message, and
digested it. Less and less is gained from
subsequent exposure. The advertising
message wears out with repeated use.
This wearing out, an example of the
principle of diminishing marginal
returns, suggests that at some expendi-
ture level, any additional dollar spent
on television advertising would not be
as effective as would an increase in
print, radio, or outdoor advertising.
Diminishing marginal returns means
that the most profitable approach to
advertising is almost always diversified
approach—funds are distributed among
all media so that the last dollar spent
goes to the most effective media outlet.
Figure 1. Fluid Milk Advertising Expenditures 1985-1996 (in 1982 dollars)





































How might the optimal mix of
advertising expenditures be deter-
mined? Once the relationship between
demand factors and fluid milk sales has
been estimated, as above, we then
consider how the supply of milk
responds to changes in fluid milk sales.
An increase in fluid milk demand
leads to higher milk prices, and higher
prices encourage more milk produc-
tion. This increased production is often
called a supply response. We devel-
oped a second econometric model to
quantify the supply response by
relating important supply factors such
as milk price and the cost of production
to the amount of milk produced in each
quarter.
The resulting estimated supply and
demand equations become important


















Figure 3. Percent Increase in Fluid Milk Demand by Media Type
as an “optimal control model.” The goal
of these models is to achieve the
greatest profits (fluid milk sales minus
advertising expenditures, in our case)
over a given time period. To do this, the
researcher adjusts the advertising
expenditure level of each media outlet
incrementally while staying within the
advertising budget. Information on
supply and demand is used to deter-
mine the amount of fluid milk sold, the
price of milk, and profits.
The model can control both the level
of estimated demand in each quarter
and the subsequent estimated supply
response. Ultimately, the optimal
control model arrives at an advertising
mix that maximizes profits throughout
the time period.
What is the optimal mix of advertising,
according to our research? On average,
the best mix of funding is that shown in
Figure 4. Television should receive
seventy percent of the advertising
budget—down from the existing
eighty-nine percent shown in Figure 2.
Outdoor advertising spending should
increase from two to fifteen percent,
radio from four percent to six percent,
and print from five percent to nine
percent.
Had the dairy board employed this
optimal advertising mix, milk produc-
ers would have been better off because
there would have been a larger demand
increase for the same level of advertis-
ing expenditure.
Suppose we go back in time to the
period 1984-1993 and switch from the
typical mix of advertising to the
calculated optimal mix.
Figure 5 shows milk demand in each
quarter with and without the switch. In
this illustration, both the typical
advertising mix (dashed line) and the
optimal advertising mix (solid line)
share the same “high” demand quarters
and “low” demand quarters. These
peaks and valleys reflect the seasonal
nature of consumer demand. Yet, it is
clear that demand from the optimal
advertising mix is greater than the
typical advertising mix.
Had this extra milk been sold, the
nation’s dairy producers would have
made an additional $265 million for
the period (about $29 million per year),
at little or no additional expenditure
on advertising. It’s simply a matter of
putting the right funds in their proper
place.
Conclusion
Clearly, dairy promotion programs
influence the amount of fluid milk
consumed in the United States each
year. Television is by far the most
effective media outlet—it is easily
five times more effective than the
alternatives.
But it is possible to have too much of
a good thing. The effectiveness of
television is subject to diminishing
marginal returns. The greatest impact
from fluid milk expenditures requires
an optimal mix of media outlets.
Our research is not without its
limitations, of course. It is important to
recognize that this study compares an
optimal media mix to a historical
media mix. Our suggested mix would
have yielded the greatest net returns for
1984-1993, yet it might not prove to
be the optimal mix in the future. As a
result, continued careful analysis must
be made to forecast fluid milk demand,
raw milk supply, and advertising
effectiveness to the media mix for









(Cleaner Air continued from page 1)
future years. Also the general results
from our national model may not
apply to specific regions within the
United States. The optimal media mix
for Minnesota milk may be different
than that for Florida milk. Again,
continued careful analysis is called
for—this time at the regional level.
Finally, we’ve assumed here that the
dairy promotion agency does not exert
market power, even though in fact it
may use the size of its media purchases
as a bargaining tool to get a dis-
counted price on advertising. Redis-
tributing funds from television to
other media outlets could reduce the
effectiveness of this bargaining tool.
This issue is beyond the scope of this
report—but we might look into it
sometime.
Figure 5. Estimated Demand Under  Typical vs. Optimal Media Mixes
(1984-1993)
polluters should reduce emissions by
what amount, which abatement
methods should be used by whom, and
which energy sources should be used.
Coordinating clean-up efforts by
hundreds or thousands of emitters—at
the least cost—is increasingly difficult.
Economists propose instead that
environmental regulators select an
overall cap on emissions of a given
pollutant and allow polluters to decide
how they might jointly achieve the
required reduction.
This idea has been put in practice in
the United States for control of sulfur
dioxide (SO
2), a primary ingredient of
acid rain. In 1990, Congress authorized
a market for SO
2 emissions. In this
article, I first summarize the new
trading rules, then discuss why
economists think markets might help,
not hinder, pollution control efforts.
Finally, I’ll evaluate the SO
2 trading
system’s performance to date.
Sulfur Dioxide Trading
The trading scheme is the first of its
kind to be attempted on a national
scale. Under the law, U.S. coal-burning
electric utilities are to reduce total
annual emissions in two increments. In
Phase I (begun in 1995), only the
dirtiest 110 plants in the country were
required to reduce their emissions. In
Phase II (beginning in 2000), total
national SO
2
 emissions will be limited
to 8.95 million tons, down from about
19 million tons in 1980.
Environmental interests had sought
even more dramatic reductions in
emissions, while the utility industry
hoped for a less ambitious emissions
target. In the end, industry interests
agreed to the 10 million tons reduction
nationwide. In return, they insisted
upon the trading scheme, believing it
would reduce their compliance costs
dramatically. If there were no trading
program, the environmental target
would not have been as ambitious.
The law creates a national market for
SO
2
 “allowances.” Each allowance
grants its bearer the right to emit one
ton of sulfur dioxide during or after the
year in which it was issued. Each
affected utility is granted allowances
tied to emission levels during a 1985-
87 base period.
During Phase I, the annual endow-
ment is enough to permit affected plants
to emit 2.5 pounds of SO
2
 for each
million Btu (mmBtu) they generate. In
Phase II, all coal-burning electric utility
plants with a capacity of at least 25
megawatts will be affected. The overall
Phase II emission restriction is also
more stringent, with endowments of
allowances equivalent to an emission
rate of no more than 1.2 pounds per
mmBtu.
Some plants now emit as much as 9
pounds of SO
2
 per mmBtu under regular
operations. Utilities such as these may
purchase allowances from other
utilities if they find the cost of doing so
is lower than the cost of alternative
compliance measures such as switching
fuels. Likewise, those utilities that
“overcomply” by reducing their
emissions more than required may sell
their excess allowances.
In both phases, utilities are given
wide latitude in complying with the
law. They may add scrubbers, switch to
low-sulfur fuels, or buy additional
allowances.
The purpose of the trading scheme,
then, is to reduce the cost of reaching
the fixed goal of 8.95 million tons of
SO
2
 emissions per year after 2000. How
big are the potential savings? In a 1993
report published by the Electric Power
Research Institute, it was estimated that
meeting the Phase II SO
2
 provision
would cost $5.1 billion annually in the
absence of an allowance market. With
full-blown allowance trading between
utilities, on the other hand, annual
compliance costs were estimated at
$2.2 billion dollars.
Minnesota’s relatively clean utilities
have been little affected during Phase I
and in Phase II, will probably feel the
effects of the law less than in most
states. I’ll return to an overview of the
Minnesota situation near the end of
this article. First, however, I want to
explain why economists are so fond of
market-based pollution-control















































The idea that markets might lead to
cost savings in pollution abatement is
quite old, dating at least to Pigou in
1932. By harnessing the powerful
incentive firms have to reduce costs,
the argument goes, and placing the
decision of how to achieve a given
environmental goal in the hands of
those who emit pollutants, we can save
money.
When one considers it carefully, this
idea seems plausible. There are many
emitting sources, each with a different
set of circumstances. Surely some will
find it less expensive to cut back their
sulfur emissions than will others. If a
system can be devised to get the former
to reduce overall emissions to accept-
able levels, while those for whom
cutting back is quite costly continue as
before (except that now they must buy
some allowances), then overall compli-
ance costs should be minimized.
From the perspective of each utility,
the decision about how to comply with
a given environmental standard is
simple. If the price of an allowance is
lower than the per-ton cost of installing
a scrubber or switching fuel, then the
utility should buy allowances to meet
its pollution goal. Otherwise, the utility
should install a scrubber or switch, and
sell any leftover allowances at the
going rate.
To illustrate, consider a world in
which two coal-burning plants supply
all of the electricity. These plants (call
them Plant 1 and Plant 2) are located
near each other, and each spews a
certain amount of SO2 into the air for
every unit of coal it burns. Imagine that
together these plants exactly meet the
demand for electricity, that they know
everything that can be known about
each other, about tomorrow’s weather,
and so on. Finally, suppose that Plant 1
is currently emitting 100 tons of SO2
annually, and that Plant 2 is emitting
150 tons.
In order to make this already fanciful
world look like the world of the
economist, we must make another
assumption about the plants. For a
given level of electricity generation,
and for a given level of sulfur emis-
sions, each plant gets everything else
just right. That is, all of the usual
optimizing behavior (employing the
right number of people, burning the
optimal amount of coal, building a
plant of exactly the right size, and so
on) is taking place. No mistakes are
being made anywhere.
Now suppose the operations of each
firm can be represented by a simple rule
that relates the amount of abatement a
firm achieves to its overall cost of
operations. The rule, called an abate-
ment cost function, represents every-
thing interesting about the plant’s
operations. It gives the cost of doing
business, but in such a way that cost
depends only on the level of SO
2
emissions.
One must bear in mind that for a
given level of electricity generation,
costs will increase as emissions
decrease. In order to produce the same
amount of electricity as emissions go
down, more must be spent on abate-
ment equipment or on low-sulfur coal.
In our example, Plant 1 is relatively
new and its level of emissions is lower
than that of Plant 2. It is also cheaper
for Plant 1 to cut back on emissions. In
the world as it exists today, suppose,
Plant 1 emits its 100 tons of sulfur
dioxide at a cost of $500 and Plant 2
emits its 150 tons at a cost of $3,266.
Total costs for the industry equal
$3,766.
The example includes one additional
actor—an environmental regulator
named Solomon. This benevolent
government employee is charged with
protecting the environment from those
who would spoil it by putting things
like SO
2 in the sky. Solomon is very
wise, however, and gets some pleasure
from making people’s lives as easy as
possible.
Solomon’s job is to look around,
decide whether there is an air pollution
problem, and, if there is one, figure out
a way to solve it. After a lengthy study,
Solomon decides that there is too much
SO
2 emission and that the annual level
should be reduced by forty percent,
from 250 to 150 tons.
This number is thereupon made the
law of the land, and Solomon is
charged with devising a plan for
meeting the new environmental target.
Two alternatives for achieving the
required 100 tons of abatement are put
forward. The first is a simple command
and control regime:  each plant will be
required to cut back in proportion
(forty percent) to its initial pollution
level. Call this the proportional
reduction (PR) plan. The second is to
implement a marketable pollution
permit scheme, under which the two
plants are together given a total of 150
allowances, each allowance granting its
holder the right to emit a ton of SO2.
Call this the tradable allowance (TA)
plan.
Under the TA plan, it is illegal to
emit more sulfur than represented by
the allowances a plant holds. With this
program the two plants have the
freedom to reach an agreement between
themselves—free, in particular, from
further government intervention—
about how much each plant should
pollute. Whatever the initial allocation
of allowances, the two plants buy and
sell allowances from one another so
that each owns exactly enough to emit
SO2 according to its own optimal plan.
Solomon’s decision about which
plan to implement is based solely on
total cost considerations. Whichever
plan is cheaper for the industry as a
whole will be chosen. The results of
these calculations appear in Table 1.
Without pollution regulation, the
numbers are as above (total cost equals
$3,766). These appear in the first
column of the table. The PR plan, as
sketched here, is easy to implement and
requires very little in the way of
calculation. Each plant must come up
with a reduction of forty percent. Plant
1 can emit only 60 tons, and Plant 2
can emit 90 tons. The corresponding
costs for Plant 1 and 2 are $645 and
$4,216 (costs go up as emission levels
fall). The total cost is $4,861.
Under the TA plan, trade between the
two plants makes the cost of achieving
the last unit of abatement the same for
each. In order to decide which plan to
implement, Solomon calculates the
optimal decision under this plan, and
compares it to $4,861.
Table 1. Total operating costs under various pollution control regimes
Status Proportional Tradable
Quo Reductions Allowances
Plant 1 Emissions $100 $60 $30
Plant 2 Emissions 150 90 120
Total Emissions 250 150 150
Plant 1 Costs 500 645 913
Plant 2 Costs 3,266 4,216 3,651
Total Costs $3,766 $4,861 $4,564
Allowance Price n.a n.a. $15.216
The cost-minimizing decision turns
out to be for Plant 1 to cut back more,
emitting a total of only 30 tons, and for
Plant 2 to emit 120 tons.
The corresponding costs of operating
(ignoring the purchase or sale of
allowances) are $913 for Plant 1 and
$3,651 for Plant 2. Total cost to the
industry is $4,564. It is also relatively
easy to calculate that the market-
clearing allowance price, the price at
which all allowances will change hands
to reach this optimal allocation, will
equal $15.21 each.
It is easy to see that Solomon will
select the tradable allowance plan.
Under this plan, total cost of compli-
ance with the environmental standard is
$298 less than under the proportional
reduction plan. To understand this, keep
in mind exactly what it is that goes
wrong if the PR plan is implemented.
Plant 2 cuts back more pollution, but at
a relatively high cost, which means the
resources devoted to pollution reduc-
tion when this plant is emitting only 90
tons are not used wisely. The same level
of expenditures on abatement at Plant 1
would have purchased a greater level of
abatement. This is the source of the
inefficiency and of the additional cost of
the PR plan over the TA plan.
Note that in this simple example, the
regulator is smart enough to be able to
calculate the outcome under the
allowance plan. So why bother with
trading? Why not simply have Solomon
calculate the optimal level of emissions
for each plant, and announce to them
what their share of the required abate-
ment will be?
The point is that in a more complex
world, the computational burden placed
upon our government official would be
Solomon is privy to the required cost
information for all plants. In the real
world, no government agency has this
cost information, nor do plants know
everything about each other. The
primary advantage inherent in a market
for allowances is that each plant needs
only to know its own cost structure and
the allowance price. The government
agency is not required to know very
much at all about the cost structure of
any of them. And still the optimal
allocation can be readied.
National Market
Performance
We have seen why an allowance-
trading scheme is appealing in concept.
But the example was exceptionally
simple, while the real work is complex.
Could such a scheme actually work in
practice? More to the point, is the SO
2
scheme working as hoped?
The short answer to this question, in
my view, is yes. Let us now take a look
at the performance of the market to
date.
Under Phase I of the SO
2 program,
110 plants were granted allowances
sufficient to emit SO2 at a rate of the
same 2.5 pounds per mmBtu. They were
also required to reduce their base level
emissions to 2.5 pounds to buy
additional allowances. The 110 plants
comprise a total of 263 “units,” or
individual boilers.
Under the law, utilities may volunteer
to include additional units in their SO
2
compliance plans. Extra units must also
meet the requirements of the law, but
utilities with many plants may find this
advantageous because of the way their
plants are coordinated to generate
electricity. In the end, a total of 445
units nationwide fell under the SO
2
control provisions in 1995; 431 were
affected in 1996 (Table 2).
These units were granted 8.75 million
allowances in 1995 and 8.30 million in
1996. Total emissions of SO
2
 by affected
plants, again nationwide, were 5.30
million tons in 1995 and 5.44 million
tons in 1996. Actual SO
2
 emissions were
lower in 1996 than in 1995, and both
were much lower than they would have
been under the pre-1990 regulations.
As of January 1997, utilities held
6.38 million unused allowances.
Because allowances can be carried from
one year to the next, or “banked,” most
utilities seem to be saving them for
when they know their annual allow-
ance allocations will shrink (in Phase II
when the calculation will be based on
1.2 pounds of SO2
 per mmBtu rather
than 2.5 pounds).
These numbers alone do not tell us
whether the market is working well or
not. How does one decide this ques-
tion? Two valuable indicators are the
number of allowances traded and the
price at which they are traded.
Let us look first at the number of
trades. As recently as 1994, when
utilities began to anticipate the new
rules, there were few trades. This
worried some observers, who took it as
an indication that the market was not
working very well.
But as time has passed, trading
volume has increased dramatically.
Figure 1 illustrates the annual volume
of allowance trades between non-
related parties. (Most of these are
between utilities, but some involve
brokers and fuel vendors as well.
Private parties can also purchase
allowances and then “retire” them. I
bought one myself in 1995 for $150,
$50 over the going rate, just to get a
framed certificate.) Of the 8.3 million
Table 2. 1995 and 1996 SO2 Emissions and Allowance Allocations
1995 1996
# Units Participating 445 431
Allowances Granted (Million) 8.75 8.30
Emissions (Million) 5.30 5.44
Figure 1. Volume of Allowance Trades




































allowances distributed in 1996, more
than 4.4 million changed hands.
Traded volume more than doubled
between 1994 and 1995, and then
doubled again between 1995 and 1996.
The 1996 trade volume numbers are
striking. They provide what may be the
most compelling evidence that the
market can work, despite a variety of
potential difficulties, including uncer-
tainty about the program’s long-term
survival, state utility regulation that has
often been designed to work against the
use of allowances, and the market
power wielded by large utilities in the
allowance market.
How about the allowance price? One
may expect the price at which allow-
ances trade to be close to the actual
cost of abatement, because utilities will
not buy them unless the price is no
higher than the cost of alternative
compliance measures. At the time the
rules were first written (1990), abate-
ment costs were thought to be as high
as $750 per ton of SO2. If this had been
correct, the allowance trading price
should be in the same neighborhood.
But shortly after allowance trading
began in 1992, allowance prices were
around $150. They fell to a low of about
$70 in early 1996 and are currently
around $100 (see Figure 2).
So abatement costs must be signifi-
cantly lower than the $750 per ton
anticipated only seven years ago. Why
were these estimates so far off? Perhaps
it is because the very possibility of
allowance trading has struck fear into
the various industries supplying the
alternative abatement methods,
Figure 2. Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Prices
encouraging them to lower their own
prices.
Minnesota and the SO2
Allowance Market
So the national allowance market
appears to be working well. But what of
Minnesota’s part in it? How will the
state be affected?
The short answer is, not much.
Minnesota utilities were already very
clean before 1995. Many of the state’s
power plants have long been fitted with
scrubbers, and most had switched to
low-sulfur western coal by the 1980s.
Both of these changes were the result of
the Minnesota Acid Precipitation
Control Act of 1980 and the 1986 rules
pertaining to it. Emissions of SO
2
 by
Minnesota utilities, which totaled
227,157 tons in 1980, had fallen to
110,189 tons by 1992—before emis-
sions trading got under way.
Minnesota’s early compliance is
“better” in the sense that our air is
relatively clean. It is “worse” in the
sense that the large cost of SO
2 abate-
ment was incurred by Minnesota
utilities and their ratepayers before the
federal rules took effect. This means,
among other things, that utilities in the
state will be granted relatively few




Indeed, only one Minnesota unit—
Northern States Power’s High Bridge
Unit 6—is affected under Phase I. NSP
chose to include five other units in
Phase I, giving it more flexibility in
meeting the requirements of the law. In
1995 and in 1996, NSP was awarded
30,604 allowances, while its emis-
sions in each year totaled around
13,600 tons. Thus, NSP was able to
bank about 17,000 allowances in
each year. These allowances will be
available for compliance in Phase II,
which will be important as demand
for NSP power grows.
Of the Minnesota plants affected
under Phase II, only Rochester Public
Utilities and the LTV Steel Mining
Company will need to purchase
allowances, according to the MPCA.
NSP and the other utilities expect
neither to buy nor to sell allowances
after the year 2000.
Conclusion
The provisions designed to reduce
SO2 emissions under the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments have put in
place an entirely new way of improv-
ing environmental quality. They
apply market forces to pollution
reduction on a massive scale.
Although many of the expectations
about how the law would work have
proven to be wrong, important
indicators show that it is nonetheless
working very well so far. Trade
volume is high, allaying fears that
electric utilities would be unwilling
to participate. Costs of achieving the
overall environmental goal are now
expected to be considerably lower
than was originally estimated.
While Minnesota utilities are not
affected by the new law as much as
are other utilities around the country,
people in this state will still benefit
from it. Without question, acid rain
will be reduced, because the rest of
the country will soon be required to
devote resources to reducing SO
2
emissions, just as Minnesota did
years ago.
The apparent success of the SO
2
allowance market might well encour-
age policy makers to try market-
based schemes for reducing emissions
of other pollutants, including water
pollution and greenhouse gases. One
such scheme (for phosphorus reduc-
tion) has just been put into place on
the Minnesota River. Perhaps I’ll
report on its economic performance
in a future issue of this publication.
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